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THE EFFECT OF THE CATCHALLS ON
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS: LITTLE RED
RIDING HOOD MEETS THE HEARSAY
WOLF AND IS DEVOURED
Myrna S. Raeder*
Asking whether "evidence law matters" ultimately depends upon a
variety of considerations, not the least of which is whether evidentiary
rules should be written without regard to any disparate effect they may
have on the parties. While some rules immediately come to mind as reflecting policy choices which favor one party or another,1 seemingly neutral rules can also produce winners and losers. This Essay focuses on the
unintended effect that the catchall hearsay exceptions, Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5), have had on criminal defendants. The
thesis of this Essay is that ordinary run-of-the-mill hearsay, even if reliable,2 should not be routinely admitted against criminal defendants pursuant to the catchalls. Several revisions to the catchalls are proposed which
would remedy their overuse by prosecutors.
I' THE PATH TO GRANDMOTHER'S HOUSE

A. Finding the Path
The catchalls were quite controversial when originally enacted but
reflected an underlying philosophy about the broad admissibility of hearsay which existed from the inception of the rulemaking process. Indeed,
the original drafters of the Federal Rules would have permitted all hear* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law; B.A., 1968, Hunter College; J.D., 1971, New York University; LL.M., 1975, Georgetown University. I wish to thank
my colleague Norman Garland for his helpful comments. The catchall research was funded by
Southwestern's Buchalter Chair.
1. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (allowing accused in criminal trial to offer evidence of
his or her character but only allowing prosecution to rebut such evidence); FED. R. EVID. 412
(preventing admission of reputation or opinion evidence of past sexual behavior of rape victim); FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (restricting use of evidence of prior conviction to attack credibility of accused unless probative value outweighs prejudicial impact).
2. Throughout this Essay the terms "reliable" and "trustworthy" are used interchangeably. Both refer to the inherent quality of the hearsay, which is determined from the "totality of
circumstances that surround the making of the statement and render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief," without reference to any outside corroboration by other evidence at trial.
Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990).
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say "if its nature and the special circumstances under which it was made
offer assurances of accuracy not likely to be enhanced by calling the de-

clarant as a witness, even though he is available," 3 or if there were
"strong assurances of accuracy and the declarant is unavailable as a wit-

ness." 4 Hearsay exceptions were listed solely by way of illustration and
not limitation. Practicing attorneys viewed this discretionary approach
to hearsay as too radical, giving judges almost unlimited power to determine hearsay issues.'
While this hearsay methodology was quickly rejected by the draft-

ers, the desire for flexibility and the growth of hearsay law resulted in the
drafting of proposed hearsay exceptions in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(6),
whose identical language permitted judges to admit statements "not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having compara-

ble circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." 6 Judge Friendly
described proposed Rule 803(24) as "the Chancellor's foot with a ven-

geance." 7 Congress had great difficulty with this version of the residual
clauses. The House of Representatives deleted these provisions from the
Rules proposed by the Supreme Court because they injected too much

uncertainty into evidence law.' The Senate bill included a narrower version, and the Conference Committee reached a compromise that was in-

tended to restrict the scope of the exceptions and require notice for their
use.
The debate in Congress concerning the catchalls pitted those who
believed that the catchalls would engulf the hearsay rule, abandon the
values underlying it, encourage forum shopping and result in unpredict3. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 8-03(a), 46 F.R.D. 345 (1969), reprintedin

JAMES

F. BAILEY,

III & OSCAR M. TRELLES, II, 2 THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, Doe. 5, at 173 (1980).
4. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 8-04(a), 46 F.R.D. 377 (1969), reprintedin 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 3, Doe. 5, at 205.
5. See, e.g., Roger C. Park, The HearsayRule and the Stabilityof Verdicts: A Response to
ProfessorNesson, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1057, 1060 n. 11(1986).
6. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence For the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 422, 439 (1971), reprintedin 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 3, Doe.
6, at 108, 125. Proposed Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(6) provide: "Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence For
the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. at 315, 422, 439.
7. Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of Reform of Federal
CriminalLaws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 264 (1973) (statement of Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit), reprinted in 3 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 3, Doe. 11, at 239, 264.
8. SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PRO-

POSED CHANGES TO H.R. 5463, 93D CONG., 1ST SEss. 30, 32 (Comm. Print June 28, 1973),
reprinted in 3 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 3, Doc. 12, at 174, 176,
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able outcomes against those who viewed the catchalls as necessary to
prevent judges from distorting the specific hearsay exceptions when faced
with reliable statements that were not otherwise admissible. While Rule
102 required that the rules be construed to secure fairness and to promote the growth and development of evidence law, with the goal of ascertaining truth, Congress believed that an escape clause was necessary
to provide for exceptional circumstances and was consistent with the
power already exercised by federal judges at common law.
Little thought was given during the Congressional Hearings to the
potential problems that such provisions would pose in criminal cases.
Indeed, the prepared testimony of a representative of the Department of
Justice, while favoring the catchalls, indicated that such flexibility was
"probably much more important for civil litigation than for criminal
cases." 9 The sole voice protesting the use of such exceptions against
criminal defendants was that of Professor Paul Rothstein, who testified
that the Rule should provide greater solicitude for the criminal accused's
right to confrontation than the Constitution demanded; he urged that
"extreme caution and reluctance be used" in admitting such hearsay
against criminal defendants."' Professor Rothstein also suggested
prohibiting the catchalls from being used against the accused in a criminal case."
The legislative history clearly reflects that the residual clauses were
not designed as a back door through which run-of-the-mill hearsay
would enter trials. The Advisory Committee note states that the exceptions in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) "do not contemplate an unfettered
exercise of judicial discretion, but they do provide for treating new and
presently unanticipated situations." 2 The Senate Committee Report referenced "certain exceptional circumstances" justifying admission under
the catchalls, such as those found in Dallas County v. Commercial Union
Assurance Co., a civil case which admitted a copy of a local newspaper
9. FederalRules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 105, 114 (1974) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of W.
Vincent Rakestraw, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs), reprinted in 4
BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 3, Doc. 14, at 114.
10. Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 273 (testimony of Paul F. Rothstein, Professor of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center), reprinted in 4 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 3,
Doc. 14, at 123. Professor Rothstein's prepared statement included two of his law review
articles that discussed this issue. See id. at 234-35, 266-67.
11. Id. at 273.
12. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 2 BAILEY & TRELLES,
supra note 3, Doc. 6, at 123.
13. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
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published over fifty years earlier,14 and the only case which had been
cited in the Advisory Committee's note." The Senate Committee Report
indicated that it had narrowed the scope of the Supreme Court version of
the residual clauses to avoid emasculating the hearsay rule and clearly
stated its views about their limited applicability: "It is intended that the
residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee does not intend to establish a
broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall
within one of the other exceptions ... ."16 The Conference Report did
not repeat the rationale underlying the Rule, but noted that it was adopting the Senate amendment which was narrower than the provision rejected by the House, with the addition of a notice requirement. 7
B.

Strayingfrom the Path

From their inception, the catchalls established the same criteria for
admission of evidence against criminal defendants as for any other party.
The only criminal case mentioned in the legislative history is United
States v. Barbati,18 which is cited in the Senate Report 19 without any
discussion. Barbati was a decision by Judge Weinstein2" concerning the
identification of a defendant who passed a counterfeit bill to a barmaid.
At trial the barmaid could not identify the defendant but testified that
she had pointed him out to the police in the bar shortly after the offense.
A police officer identified the defendant as the person who the barmaid
pointed out. Two things should be noted about Barbati: (1) the hearsay
at issue was separately codified in the Federal Rules as prior identification, an exception which was recognized in a number of states at the time
14. S.REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974), reprinted in 4 BAILEY & TRELLES,
supra note 3, Doe. 15, at 19.
15. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note, reprintedin 2 BAILEY & TRELLES,
supra note 3, Doc. 6, at 123.
16. S.REP. No. 1277, supra note 14, at 20, reprintedin 4 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note
3, Doe. 15, at 20.
17. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974), reprintedin 4 BAILEY &
TRELLES, supra note 3, Doc. 16, at 11.
18. 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
19. S.REP. No. 1277, supra note 14, at 19, reprintedin 4 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note
3, Doc. 15, at 19.
20. Judge Weinstein advocated a discretionary approach to hearsay admission balancing
probative force against prejudice. See Jack B. Weinstein, ProbativeForce ofHearsay, 46 IOWA
L. REV. 331, 338 (1961).
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Barbati was decided;2 1 and (2) the declarant testified at trial. 22
Interestingly, a computerized search for federal cases citing Barbati
and Dallas County prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence revealed only one criminal case of the forty-eight cases located
which referred to Dallas County in dicta as supporting the admission of
hearsay in criminal proceedings.2 3 Perusing these cases for citations to
other decisions revealed only five criminal cases arguably on point. One

concerned prior identifications made by a witness at a grand jury and at a
former trial which were inconsistent with his trial testimony. 24 Another
reversed the district court's admission of prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence.2" The third did not rely on any expansive hearsay
theory, but eloquently stated the rationale for enacting the catchalls in

dicta:
We are loath to reduce the corpus of hearsay rules to a straitjacketing, hypertechnical body of semantical slogans to be
mechanically invoked regardless of the reliability of the proffered evidence. Instead, "we should indeed welcome," as Judge
Learned Hand once wrote, "any efforts that help disentangle

(sic] us26from the archaisms that still impede our pursuit of
truth.

The fourth case was one in which the defense, rather than the prosecu21. See, eg., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1238 (West 1966); HAWAII EVID. CODE § 802.1 (1985);
MONTANA R. EVID. 801; OHio EViD. RULE 801 (1980); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,

272 n.3 (1967).
22. Barbati,284 F. Supp. at 409.
23. La Porte v. United States, 300 F.2d 878, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1962). The court in La Porte
admitted a Selective Service Form 153 under 28 U.S.C. § 1733 and as an official record. The
supervisor who testified had no independent recollection of the case but described the office
procedure concerning the form's creation. The only case citing Barbati prior to 1976 was
Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), also a Weinstein decision.
Chubbs, who had been convicted of first degree sodomy and burglary and second degree assault, brought a habeas corpus challenge to the testimony of a police officer who testified about
the victim's identification of Chubbs. The court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, holding
that it did not raise a constitutional issue. Id. at 1187, 1194.
24. United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir. 1964). In United States v. Nucdio, 373 F.2d 168, 172 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967), the Second Circuit refused
to extend De Sisto to require the admission of inconsistent statements of a witness made at a
trial of other defendants as substantive evidence.
25. United States v. Schwartz, 390 F.2d 1, 3-4 (3d Cir. 1968). The district court had relied
on De Sisto in admitting the evidence. The appellate court did not decide whether it would
follow De Sisto because it found that the statement lacked the guarantees of trustworthiness
that had been found in the De Sisto case. Schwartz, 390 F.2d at 5-6.
26. United States v. Castellana, 349 F.2d 264, 276 (2d Cir. 1965) (quoting United States v.
Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 984 (1957)). The
Castellana court found that the statement at issue, which was made in deposition testimony,
either met the co-conspirators exception or was harmless error. Id. at 275-77.
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tion, introduced evidence which would have met the criteria of the proposed former testimony exception.2 7
The final case was the only one that raised confrontation concerns.
In United States v. Kearney2 a statement was made by a dying officer to
a detective approximately twelve hours after he was shot, and one hour
after awakening from the anaesthetic administered in his first of two operations. The statement consisted of a description of his assailant and of
what happened. The officer died during the second operation. The court
stated that it need not decide if this was either an excited utterance, as
labeled by the trial judge, or a dying declaration because it could not find
error in the trial judge's decision that the evidence was "fundamentally
reliable."' 29 The court in Kearney considered the statement to be in the
"penumbra" of both exceptions. In an extended footnote, the court discussed how the statement related to both exceptions and would have
been admitted as such by some courts.30 It is likely that the introduction
of the statements would have been harmless error, if any error at all
under traditional hearsay analysis.
As the preceding discussion shows, the drafters had no reason to
believe that the catchalls would have any significance in criminal cases,
let alone in cases in which the declarant did not testify. This premise is
reinforced by examining then-existing Confrontation Clause 3' analysis in
connection with the decision not to codify confrontation law in the evidence rules. In 1975 the explosion of Confrontation Clause cases in the
Supreme Court was barely in its infancy. The Court had only hinted that
the clause would permit the use of critical hearsay of nontestifying declarants who had not been subjected to cross-examination in circumstances other than those exemplified by such rarities as dying
declarations.32 For example Douglas v. Alabama3 3 and Pointer v.
Texas3 4 could be interpreted as forbidding admission of any statement
27. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that trial
court's refusal to admit evidence was prejudicial error).
28. 420 F.2d 170, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
29. Id. at 175.
30. Id. at 175 n. 11. In relation to a different asserted error, the court indicated that as to
the issue of the assailant's identity, "the possibility of mistaken identity is strongly negativedif indeed it is not eliminated beyond reasonable doubt-by the scientific evidence." Id. at 174.
There was also an eyewitness who testified and the statements weie used as corroboration.
31. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to ...be confronted
with the witnesses against him ...." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
32. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
33. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
34. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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that is not subject to cross-examination at trial.35 The focus in California
v. Green36 was directed to out-of-court statements of the witness, some of
which were given in a preliminary hearing. Only Dutton v. Evans3 7 pertained to hearsay of a declarant who did not testify at trial. Yet the
rationale of that plurality decision was so confusing that Idaho v.
Wright38 recently confirmed what commentators had long argued-that
the case ultimately rested on harmless error.
Congress declined to import constitutional requirements into the evidence rules because to the extent the rules conflicted with the Constitution they would be invalid. This philosophy was specifically described as
follows: "[T]he basic approach of the rules is to avoid codifying, or attempting to codify, constitutional evidentiary principles, such as the fifth
amendment's right against self-incrimination and, here, the sixth amendment's right of confrontation. Codification of a constitutional principle
is unnecessary and, where the principle is under development, often
unwise."3 9
Given the state of confrontation law in 1975, however, few recognized the threat to criminal defendants implicit in an expansive interpretation of the catchalls. Confrontation was clearly an ongoing
congressional concern in relation to other proposed rules, including
Rules 804(b)(2) 40 and 804(b)(4),' I yet it was only at the very moment
before voting on the entire set of Rules that any outcry was made about
the potential of the catchall enacted as Rule 804(b)(5) to adversely impact criminal defendants. When the Conference Report was presented to
35. In New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 649 (1986), four Justices noted that "to the
extent that Douglas v. Alabama interpreted the Confrontation Clause as requiring an opportunity for cross-examination prior to the admission of a co-defendant's out-of-court statement,
the case is no longer good law." See also Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403-05 (fundamental right of
confrontation includes right of cross-examination).
36. 399 U.S. 149, 153 (1970).
37. 400 U.S. 74, 77 (1970).
38. 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150-51 (1990).
39. See S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 14, at 22 (commentary concerning statements
against penal interest), reprintedin 4 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 3, Doe. 15, at 22.
40. See RULES OF EVIDENCE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON REFORM
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HousE OF REPRESENTA-

TIVES, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 513, 541 (Mar. 15, 1973) (dialogue between Mr. Hungate and Mr.

Cleary), reprintedin 3 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 3, Doe. 11, at 541. Ultimately this rule,
which would have permitted statements of recent perception of unavailable declarants, was not
adopted.
41. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 8-04(b)(4), 46 F.R.D. 377 (1969), reprinted in 3 BAILEY &
TRELLES, supra note 3, Doe. 5, at 206. The House version of declarations against interest
which was ultimately enacted as Federal Rule of Evidence 803(b)(3) would have codified its
understanding of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Senate deleted the
provision.
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the House, Representative Holtzman protested that proposed Rule
804(b)(5):
[B]asically abolishes the rules against hearsay and leaves it to
the discretion of every judge to let in any kind of hearsay that
he wants. This is true for criminal as well as civil cases.
One of the basic assumptions in our system of jurisprudence is that the defendant in criminal trials has the right to
confront his accuser. To abolish all prohibitions against hearsay really abridges our concept of a fair trial, aside from creating some Sixth Amendment problems.42
Her concerns were echoed by Representatives Eckhardt and Danielson. 3 Representative Dennis responded for the Conference Committee
by stating that "I prefer to leave this 'catchall' provision out, but I do
think it is not really as bad as has been made out here; and certainly in a
criminal case if there is anything unconstitutional about it it cannot be
done, of course."' He continued by asserting that "I am supporting it as
a reasonable compromise which really does not add a whole lot"'4 because common law courts already could and occasionally did graft new
exceptions onto the hearsay rule. Ms. Holtzman was not satisfied, and
asked whether police reports could be admitted under the catchall without any officer testifying, although specifically excluded elsewhere.46 Mr.
Dennis answered that "I cannot see how anybody could suggest that introducing such a report is possible."'4 7
Representative Mayne then gave an impassioned plea that two years
of congressional review and seven years of work by the Advisory Committee would be wasted if the report was voted down. He contended that
due to changes in membership of the Judiciary Committee, "this very
complicated subject would have to be taken up from scratch by new
members having no familiarity with it."'4 The combination of downplaying any significance of the catchalls in criminal prosecutions and
threatening that the Rules might never be enacted led to their approval
in the House.4 9 Ultimately, if the only function of the catchalls was to
provide a rarely used safety valve, primarily in civil cases, there was no
reason to derail the enactment of the Rules to impose criteria limiting
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

120 CONG. REc. 40,892 (1974).
Id. at 40,893-94.
Id. at 40,894.
Id.
Id. at 40,895.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40,896-97 (by a vote of 363 to 32, with 39 not voting).
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their use against criminal defendants, particularly when such hearsay
would likely be rejected anyway as impinging on confrontation values.
Given this legislative history and the then-existing confrontation
case law, only a doomsayer would have prophesied how successful prosecutors would later become in convicting defendants by introducing statements of absent declarants pursuant to the judge's discretion to admit
trustworthy hearsay. It is ironic that when the catchalls were enacted no
one even thought to raise the specter of Sir Walter Raleigh being sent to
his death based on the affidavit of an alleged co-conspirator who recanted
his torture-procured testimony, and on the testimony of a pilot relating
the opinion of a Portuguese gentleman.5 0
II.
A.

THE HEARSAY WOLF

The Hearsay Wolf Arrives Dressed in Sheep's Clothing

The past sixteen years have underscored the naivet6 of permitting
lawyers to argue that judges should use their discretion to admit "trustworthy" hearsay without providing any significant restrictions in the
catchall language. Although Congress praised the restraint that common
law judges had shown in developing hearsay policy, in reality lawyers
and judges were citing Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance
Co.51 regularly as support for expansive evidentiary interpretations, with
at least ten of the nearly fifty decisions directed at otherwise inadmissible
hearsay. It was only natural that codifying the catchalls would lead to
their ever-increasing popularity. From their enactment in 1975 to July
1991, more than 400 decisions have considered the admissibility of hearsay pursuant to the catchalls,5 2 or roughly eight times the entire number
of cases that cited Dallas County in a comparable timeframe. In a complete turnaround, however, approximately sixty percent of the catchall
cases are criminal, in contrast to the negligible references to expansive
hearsay interpretation in criminal proceedings prior to 1975." 3 In fact,
50. See, eg., 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
333-36 (London, MacMillan 1883); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontationand
the HearsayRule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 99-101 (1972).
51. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
52. Cases are included in the study if the catchall is used as the basis of the decision as well
as if the catchall is cited as an alternative reason justifying the decision. The catchall study is
on file with the author. See Myrna S. Raeder, Confronting the Catch-Alls, 6 CRIM. JUST. 31,
31 (1991) [hereinafter Raeder, Catch-Alls]; Myrna S. Raeder, Comments ConcerningProfessor
Swift's Paper: Has the HearsayRule Been Abolished De Facto by JudicialDecision?, 76 MINN.
L. REv. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at 8, on file with author) [hereinafter Raeder,
Comments].
53. Raeder, Comments, supra note 52 (manuscript at 2 n.2, on file with author).
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more than forty percent of all hearsay sought to be introduced under the
catchalls is proffered by prosecutors."
While the catchalls affect both civil and criminal litigation, their use
as a prosecutorial weapon in the war against crime, a role never envisioned, raises a number of concerns. Of the roughly 250 catchall criminal cases, almost seventy percent are attempts by prosecutors to admit
hearsay whose admission is doubtful under the specific exceptions.5 5 Not
only are prosecutors prolific catchall users, but they are quite successful
in persuading judges to admit such hearsay in district courts and then
having the admission upheld on appeal. Close to eighty-one percent of
the prosecutor's catchall hearsay is ultimately admitted. 6 Appellate review of catchall hearsay for abuse of discretion and harmless error ultimately diminishes the likelihood that criminal defendants can obtain
reversals of their convictions. Approximately twenty-five percent of the
appellate cases which affirmed catchall criminal convictions referred to
harmless error.5 7 An even more troubling concern is the asymmetry of
success rates between prosecutors and defendants trying to use the catchalls. Criminal defendants succeed only in fifteen percent of their attempts to affirmatively use the catchalls. 8 Even if one were to subtract
appeals won by prosecutors in cases which refer to harmless error, there
is still an overall sixty-four percent prosecutorial success rate in district
and appellate courts.5 9
B.

The Hearsay Wolf Knocks on Grandmother'sDoor

It is difficult to imagine that the trustworthiness of prosecutorial
hearsay is so far superior to that of defense hearsay to warrant such different results. It is unlikely that the inability of prosecutors to appeal
from acquittals accounts for this discrepancy, given the low percentage of
acquittals and the significant disparity of success between prosecutors
and defendants in district court." Moreover, prosecutors can appeal
from adverse pretrial evidentiary rulings.6 1 Nor is it probable that de54. Id. (manuscript at 2 n.2, on file with author).
55. Raeder, Catch-Alls, supra note 52, at 31.
56. Raeder, Comments, supra note 52 (manuscript at 4, on file with author).
57. Of 118 appellate cases in which the prosecutor's use of catchall hearsay was affirmed,
29 contained a reference to harmless error. Raeder, Comments, supra note 52 (manuscript at
4, on file with author).
58. Raeder, Comments, supra note 52 (manuscript at 4, on file with author); see Raeder,
Catch-Alls, supra note 52, at 31.
59. Raeder, Comments, supra note 52 (manuscript at 4-5, on file with author).
60. Id. (manuscript at 5, on file with author).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988); see United States v. Mokol, 939 F.2d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 1991)
(interlocutory appeal by government from adverse catchall ruling).
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fense catchall hearsay is often admitted, but does not surface on appeal,
since the ever present discussion of defense evidence in harmless error
analyses would reveal such admissions.
As I have argued in another article, the catchalls undermine the
structure of the hearsay rules, resulting in a discretionary approach to
hearsay to the detriment of fixed rules.62 Their existence permits judges
and lawyers to be sloppy because difficult hearsay questions do not have
to be carefully analyzed if the catchall provides a ready escape clause.
There is even a tendency to cite the catchalls for simple hearsay problems
because their criteria may be easier to satisfy than those of specific hearsay exceptions. Moreover, the expansive nature of catchall offers has not
been curbed at the appellate level because of the combined effect of harmless error and abuse of discretion on reversals.
The lack of predictability in catchall application is debilitating to
litigators who must evaluate whether or not to settle the case. In the
criminal arena, the discretionary aspect of the catchalls is particularly
troubling. It has been posited that discretionary rulings rarely benefit
criminal defendants. 63 If this is true, the present catchalls preordain that
most prosecutorial hearsay will be admitted simply because Federal
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) have few restrictions other than trustworthiness, despite the intent to limit the catchalls to exceptional cases."
62. Raeder, Comments, supra note 52 (manuscript at 7-12, on file with author).
63. See Eleanor Swift, Has the Hearsay Rule Been Abolished De Facto By JudicialDecision, 76 MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1992); J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-choiceApproach to Limiting PrejudicialEvidence, 64 IND. LJ. 831, 865 (1989).
64. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) provides that the following documents are not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a witness:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance
of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare
to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) provides that the following is not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable effort; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
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The catchalls do not require findings of fact, nor clear and convincing evidence of trustworthiness or necessity. The materiality requirement is synonymous with relevance, which is required for all evidence.
Serving the "interests of justice" has been construed as affirming the discretionary nature of the judge's decision to admit catchall statements.65
Even the meaning of "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" has remained elusive, since the twenty-seven categorical exceptions used for comparison have widely varying rationales for justifying
the admission of hearsay.
The catchall notice provision has not provided a sufficient opportunity to challenge the hearsay evidence because of the flexible approach
taken by many courts that have permitted notice at trial. 6 In addition,
notice is an illusive protection in criminal cases because the defense is not
entitled to depose witnesses. Thus, the declarant as well as the prosecutor's potential witnesses can refuse to talk to the defense.
The only restriction that may have stemmed the catchall tide is the
requirement that the statement be more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can procure
through reasonable means. The Senate intended this "to insure that only
statements which have high probative value and necessity" 67 would be
admitted. However, this provision has rarely been viewed as imposing
any additional condition on the catchalls. This is best demonstrated by
the large number of decisions finding the admission of catchall hearsay to
be harmless error.68 If catchall evidence is only cumulative, it should
never have been admitted in the first place. All catchall errors which do
not result in reversals merely confirm that the exceptions have become a
dumping ground for the discretionary admission of ordinary reliable
hearsay.
Today the catchalls routinely permit "near misses" to be introduced
against criminal defendants. 69 A "near miss" just falls short of a recogunless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance

of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare
to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).

65. Raeder, Catch-Alls, supra note 52, at 32.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488, 492 (1st Cir. 1988) (not receiving notice
before trial does not constitute grounds for denying hearsay evidence when defendant does not
object), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1049 (1989). See also Raeder, Catch-Alls, supra note 52, at 3436, for a more detailed discussion of this problem.
67. S.REP. No. 1277, supra note 14, at 18, reprintedin 4 BAILEY & TRELLEs, supra note
3, Doe. 15, at 19.
68. Raeder, Catch-alls,supra note 52, at 32-33.
69. See id. (discussing near-miss theory popularized in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
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nized hearsay exception, and may encompass a category of hearsay that
was rejected from inclusion as an exception. Thus, if the catchalls did
not exist, grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness could not be
introduced.7" Testimony of child witnesses that are not excited utterances or statements for medical diagnosis or treatment would be inadmissible. Quasi-business records that cannot meet the foundation required
by Rule 803(6) would not be permitted. Official records that violate Rule
803(8)(B) because they reflect the observations of law enforcement personnel would not have an alternative route to admission. Prior consistent and inconsistent statements not meeting the criteria of Rule 801
would not be admitted substantively. Yet current catchall interpretation
gives the judge discretion to admit hearsay evidence under all of these
hidden categories. 7 1
Do so many more categories of reliable hearsay exist today than
previously which warrant admission? Or have the catchalls turned what
were once considered police and prosecutorial investigative tools into evidence?7 2 In other words, are law enforcement personnel now obtaining
and recording more statements than before or are prosecutors merely
attempting, often successfully, to introduce more of these statements?
Certainly the evidence rules encourage prosecutors to routinely dispatch
witnesses to the grand jury, since prior inconsistent statements are only
admitted substantively if given under oath in some proceeding. Thus, the
logical way to protect against a turncoat witness also creates an opportunity under the catchall when the declarant becomes unavailable. One
commentator suggests that the reason prosecutors must turn to the
catchalls is because the specific exceptions reflect the historical suspicion
of government-created hearsay.73
Pressure points in the criminal justice system appear to drive prosecutors to the catchalls, with drug cases providing approximately onethird of the criminal catchall citations in the last five years. Child abuse
cases have recently become more prevalent in federal court, raising
Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1262-64 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese
Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574
(1986)).
70. Raeder, Catch-Alls, supra note 52, at 33; see Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of
the HearsayRule: The Residual Hearsay Exceptions, CircumstantialGuaranteesof Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 431, 445 (1985).
71. See Raeder, Catch-Alls, supra note 52, at 33.
72. See Roger C. Park, A Subject MatterApproach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv.
51, 94-104 (1987), for an insightful analysis of the difficulties which would arise if the hearsay
rule were abolished in criminal cases, including encouraging abuse of governmental power.
73. Roger W. Kirst, The ProceduralDimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L.
REv. 485, 495 (1987).
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catchall issues concerning frightened, inarticulate witnesses as well as
children who do not testify at all.' 4 A number of state catchall cases

regarding child witnesses are also being reviewed in federal court on constitutional grounds in habeas corpus actions.
Quasi-business and official records often appear to be offered pursuant to the catchalls because of sloppy trial preparation or as an end-run
against the ban on statements made by law enforcement personnel found
in Rule 803(8). 7 5 Statements to law enforcement officials by a variety of
declarants are proffered for several reasons. First, too few people have a

sense of responsibility about being a good citizen that includes participation in trials that do not directly affect them. Second, our criminal justice system often severely inconveniences witnesses, discouraging those
who do not want to make numerous futile appearances. Third, due to
the restricted discovery in criminal cases, prosecutors do not always pre-

pare their cases until shortly before trial, at a time when it may be too
late to do additional investigation or obtain a witness. Finally, prosecutors sometimes prefer presenting the hearsay of unsympathetic declar-

ants, such as informers and accomplices, through the testimony of
credible police officers.
One might also ask what effect the catchalls have on the number of
76
criminal trials. Even without the catchalls, the Sentencing Guidelines
have undoubtedly resulted in more cases being tried,77 because a defend-

ant's sentence is not likely to be substantially lower if a plea is entered
74. See, eg., United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 394-95 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
210 (1991) (holding admissible social worker's testimony relating child's statements concerning play with anatomically correct dolls pursuant to Rule 803(24) where court found child too
young to testify); United States v. St. John, 851 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding
admissible statements made by child to social worker and clinical psychologist pursuant to
Rule 803(24) where child's testimony at trial was hindered by his age, developmental problems
and inability to verbalize the delicate nature of the offense); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d
336, 342 (8th Cir. 1986) (questioning admissibility of out-of-court statement by child to social
worker under catchall exceptions).
75. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) provides that the following documents are not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a witness:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, excluding, however in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and
other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against
the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
77. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-

1989, tbl. 5.21, at 498 (Timothy Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1990).
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unless the prosecutor reduces the charges in a way that materially affects
the maximum penalty that the defendant can receive. As a result, prosecutors may be forced to try more troublesome cases, which would have
been disposed of by generous plea bargains in prior years. Such cases
place additional pressure on prosecutors to resort to the catchalls. Prosecutors who use the catchalls are simply taking advantage of the evidence
rules to meet their high burden of proof. The existence of the catchalls,
however, encourages them to take risks and the discretionary character
of the rulings gives them a significant advantage over criminal
defendants.
While the Confrontation Clause is still the ultimate barrier to trial
by untested hearsay, such protection is much less expansive than at the
time the Federal Rules were drafted. This is not to imply that all hearsay
will survive a Confrontation Clause challenge. Lee v. Illinois7" and
Idaho v. Wright7 9 demonstrate that some life still lingers in confrontation
jurisprudence. But, if the catchalls did not exist, courts would never
reach the confrontation question because the evidence simply would not.
be admissible under any evidentiary theory. Moreover, in cases where
the declarant testifies, the catchall trumps because the Confrontation
Clause is not ordinarily implicated."0 Therefore, when asked if the catchalls matter, the answer for criminal defendants is yes-with a vengeance.

III.

SHOULD LITTLE RED RIDING

HOOD BE SAVED?

Merely uncovering the continued prosecutorial use of the catchalls
is not enough. The real question is: should we care? What values, if
any, are threatened by the overuse of the catchalls against criminal defendants? Does the nation's preoccupation with crime, drugs and child
abuse justify the unforeseen expansion of the catchalls to ensure that society is better protected than it would be without them? Certainly, the
admission of most so-called "trustworthy" hearsay does make it easier
for the prosecution to convict defendants by providing the fact finders
with additional relevant evidence as well as corroboration for existing
evidence. Indeed, if one believes the storytelling model of jury decision78. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
79. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
80. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (Steven, J., concurring) (witness's out-of-court identification of accused admissible and does not violate Confrontation
Clause where witness cannot recall identification at trial); cf. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct.
3157, 3167 (1990) (permitting testimony of child via closed circuit television upon specific
finding that child's testimony in courtroom in presence of defendant would result in child
suffering serious emotional distress such that child could not reasonably communicate).
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making,8 1 such hearsay may act as the glue that cements together the
prosecutor's theory of the case. If so, the government's case is considerably strengthened by the admission of reliable hearsay, which considered
by itself might not be regarded as critical. Even speculative gossip can
sound believable; otherwise why would someone repeat it? Similarly,
"trustworthy" hearsay is likely to be deemed credible, unless shown
otherwise.
Ultimately, the rationale favoring catchall admission focuses on necessity. By loosely interpreting the catchalls, courts produce more guilty
verdicts that are saved on appeal because cases are not reversed unless
trial courts abuse their discretion, and the resulting error is not harmless.
On appeal, gauging the prejudice to the defendant is particularly daunting because one can never know whether the absence of the catchall information would have negated the theory of the case adopted by the jury.
A.

Should the Hearsay Wolf Be Tamed?

Hearsay theory, Confrontation Clause analysis and other process
concerns must be evaluated in determining the proper response to the
overuse of the catchalls by prosecutors. Whether one views the hearsay
rule as the child of the adversary system or the child of the jury system, it
is an exclusionary rule setting boundaries on what jurors can consider.
The dangers posed by the inability to evaluate the sincerity, perception,
memory and narration of the out-of-court declarant underly the hearsay
rule. The justifications for not liberalizing the hearsay rule in criminal
cases include concerns about: (1) distortion of testimony; (2) providing a
tactical advantage to the prosecutors in criminal actions, who are likely
to have more access to hearsay; (3) providing a tactical advantage to
prosecutors because hearsay makes it easier to establish a prima facie
case; (4) distrust of judges; and (5) systemic effects resulting in less firsthand testimonial accounts, which may threaten the integrity of the trial
process.8 2 The dangers of fabrication and perjury are particularly troubling when the declarant is unavailable.8 3
Professor Swift's analysis of the problems associated with abolishing
the hearsay rule raises similar concerns.8 4 She identifies the following
81. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of JuridicalProof,13 CARDOZO L. REv. 373,
396-406 (1991); see generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986).
82. RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 520-25 (2d ed. 1982).
83. Park, supra note 72, at 73-74.

84. See Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 495 (1987) [hereinaf-
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problems: (1) jurors will have fewer facts about the testimonial qualities
of declarants who are not identified;"5 (2) more cases will be submitted to
the jury that require hard choices between conflicting inferences concerning statements made by "risky" self-interested declarants;"6 and (3) the
hearsay proponent will obtain a tactical advantage by not being required
to provide a witness who is knowledgeable about the contents of documents, while adding a burden to the opponent to discredit the document. 7 Even if one can adequately evaluate hearsay not fitting into the
categorical exceptions, its admission should be suspect because the advantage is shifted to the prosecutor who is provided with additional evidence to help meet the burden of production and persuasion.
Undoubtedly, some will argue that we should trust the common
sense of jurors more than we do, and claim that judges are no better
suited to determine trustworthiness than jurors. The hearsay rule admittedly is rooted in a distrust of jurors. In contrast, the catchalls manifest a
total belief in the ability of jurors to sort the wheat from the chaff so long
as the judge considers it trustworthy. What does trustworthiness mean?
Many of the exceptions assume that the circumstances surrounding the
statement ensure that the statement was reliable when made. Yet crossexamination of declarants concerning such statements could reveal their
feet of clay. Indeed, changing psychological and religious beliefs undermine some of the assumptions supporting some exceptions. Is a person
more likely to be correct when excited? Is someone who is dying always
motivated to be truthful?
The manner in which courts determine catchall trustworthiness is
currently in flux. Many courts have relied on corroboration to support
admission of such catchall categories as grand jury testimony. 8 The
Court in Idaho v. Wright, 9 however, recently held that for confrontation
purposes trustworthiness must be determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement that render the declarant's statement particularly worthy of belief. Thus, physical or other
confirming evidence from witnesses is not to be considered in the constitutional trustworthiness analysis. It is unclear whether courts will uniformly adopt this standard for determining the evidentiary admissibility
of catchall hearsay. If they do not, however, the catchall trustworthiness
ter Swift, Abolishing Hearsay]; Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75
CAL. L. REv. 1339 (1987).
85. Swift, Abolishing Hearsay, supra note 84, at 499.
86. Id. at 510-12.
87. Id. at 514.
88. Raeder, Catch-Alls, supra note 52, at 36-37.
89. 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3148 (1990).
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standard will be meaningless in cases where the declarant is unavailable
because the standard would permit hearsay by relying on the very corroboration that must be excluded for Confrontation Clause purposes.
Moreover, as the court in Wright noted, "[t]here is a very real danger
that a jury will rely on partial corroboration to mistakenly infer the trustworthiness of the entire statement." 90
When the confrontation issue is not implicated or raised, or is incorrectly decided by the trial court, injecting corroboration into the trustworthiness analysis effectively merges harmless error doctrine with
evidence law. There may be benefits of such a merger. For example, if
the defendant is not promised a perfect trial, why decide difficult evidence issues that are ultimately not important to the outcome of the
case? On the other hand, this approach devalues the role of cross-examination in criminal trials. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, catchall
hearsay is not intended to encompass unimportant information.
While it is too soon to tell if Wright's trustworthiness criteria will
result in more careful catchall rulings, at least one recent case reversed
the admission of grand jury testimony based on the new standard. 9 1 Obviously, if judges exclude corroboration from their original assessments
of whether the hearsay is reliable enough to meet the Confrontation
Clause, less hearsay will be admitted than if corroboration were considered in the trustworthiness analysis. On appeal, of course, such corrobo92
ration will be examined in determining the existence of harmless error.
The routine admission of catchall hearsay should not be permitted
regardless of whether the evidence is reliable by virtue of the circumstances surrounding its creation or by reference to corroboration. In
either event, cross-examination often has more than marginal utility.
The fact that a statement has some reliability is not the same as saying
that it is free from doubt. For example, cross-examination of a declarant
could reveal the presence of bias or stress or reveal mistaken assumptions
that are not obvious on the face of the statement.
Moreover, it is much more difficult to contest the validity of a statement when the witness in court is an authoritative or sympathetic person
who has no or few testimonial disadvantages. For example, compare a
police officer testifying about a statement made by one of the defendant's
cohorts with the testimony of the declarant. The police officer will usually be a good witness, one to whom the jurors can relate-articulate,
90. Id. at 3151.
91. United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 327 (6th Cir. 1991).
92. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150-51.
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confident and usually not in possession of information that discredits the
hearsay.
The declarant, in contrast, is usually not a good witness and will
likely be viewed as trying to exculpate himself or herself. The declarant's
appearance and testimony will often put off the jury, and at best, will
result in the impression that he or she is either biased or evasive. Similarly, if an officer testifies to the statements of the defendant's estranged
wife, her mixed motives cannot be presented to the jury as forcefully by
presenting her impeachment through the officer's testimony as by crossexamining her. A child witness may give contradictory or coached testimony or be manipulated by parents or other authority figures. Such infirmities are less likely to be exposed when the medical doctor or teacher
testifies to statements made by that child than if the child were to testify.
Countervailing arguments based on the cost or inconvenience of producing declarants scarcely provide enough justification to warrant foregoing
the protections of the hearsay rule in criminal cases.
B.

Confronting the Hearsay Wolf

Beyond hearsay theory, what if any protection does the Confrontation Clause offer from overuse of the catchalls? In 1975 the strict interpretation of the Confrontation Clause led Congress to assume that there
would be relatively few attempts to rely on the catchalls when the declarants were unavailable for trial. The constitutional revolution that has
occurred in the past ten years has frustrated this expectation by substituting a minimalist approach to confrontation and other individual liberties.
As a result, the United States Constitution must currently be viewed
as providing a floor rather than a ceiling for such rights. Both confrontation and due process analysis are viewed as balancing tests which weigh
the competing interests of effective law enforcement and accurate
factfinding.9 3 The United States Supreme Court is primarily concerned
with confrontation as a functional right that promotes reliability in criminal trials. In particular, the Sixth Amendment now acts as a virtual
rubber stamp for traditional hearsay exceptions.9 4 Even statements ad93. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (confrontation analysis); Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-13 (1977) (due process analysis).
94. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987) (holding that Confrontation Clause does not require court to independently inquire into reliability when evidence falls within firmly rooted hearsay exception, such as Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which allows
out-of-court statements by co-conspirators to be admitted); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (particularized search for indicia of reliability unnecessary when prior testimony at preliminary hearing
was subject to cross-examination, even though declarant now unavailable for trial).
White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 n.8 (1992), recently embraced this approach when it
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mitted pursuant to the catchalls, which do not otherwise fall within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, may be sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the Confrontation Clause," because cross-examination is not the exclusive means of determining if hearsay has particularized guarantees of
96
trustworthiness.
The focus of confrontation has shifted from the right to cross-examine declarants of out-of-court statements to the right to prohibit unreliable hearsay. 97 This approach confers constitutional status on
Wigmore's analysis of hearsay logic. Wigmore believed that when it is
sufficiently clear that the statement offered is free enough from the risk of
inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, "cross-examination would be a work
of supererogation." 9" Idaho v. Wright" interpreted this to mean that
hearsay is permitted when "the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from
the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would
be of marginal utility.""l In a sleight of hand, Wright then transformed
this explanation into a test for determining whether the Confrontation
Clause has been violated. First, the Court asserted that " 'firmly rooted'
hearsay exception[s] are so trustworthy that adversarial testing would
add little to their reliability."10' Second, the Court required that other
hearsay, which must demonstrate "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' ... [be] so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add
little to their reliability.',102
Wright does limit the search for reliability to the inherent trustworthiness of the statement, thereby excluding reference to other evidence at
' 3 However, this restriction is also grounded
trial. 10
in the quest for reliability, since such corroboration "would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of
other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement
noted that spontaneous declarations and statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment were both firmly rooted. As a.result, the Court held that no showing of unavailability of the declarant is necessary to survive a Confrontation Clause challenge. Id. at 743. Thus,
any statement which is admitted pursuant to either of these exceptions automatically passes
the Confrontation Clause analysis. Id.
95. See Idaho v. Wright, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147 (1990).
96. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986).
97. See JoAnne A. Epps, Passingthe Confrontation Clause Stop Sign: Is All Hearsay Constitutionally Admissible?, 77 Ky.L.J. 7, 46 (1988-89).
98. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1420, at 251
(Chadbourn rev. 1974).
99. 110 S.Ct. 3139 (1990).
100. Id. at 3149.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 3150.
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that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so
trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility.' °4
Even the dissenters in Wright, who would rely on corroboration, do
so by analogy to Fourth Amendment cases that are "premised upon the
idea that corroboration is a legitimate indicator of reliability." 10 While
Wright held that introduction of a particular statement of an unavailable
child pursuant to Idaho's catchall violated the Confrontation Clause, it
rejected a rule which would per se exclude any statements of child declarants as frustrating the truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation
Clause and hindering states in developing their law of evidence. 10 6 Thus,
confrontation is now viewed primarily as preventing convictions based
on unreliable out-of-court evidence.
C. Should Live Testimony Vanquish the Hearsay Wolf?
The pursuit of reliability downplays confrontation as a constitutional preference for live testimony. The United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly made clear that the word "confront" does not prohibit the
admission of all accusatory hearsay statements made by an absent deelarant.107 When the declarant is unavailable, necessity dictates that the
hearsay be admitted if it is, trustworthy. 0 8 In other words, the public's
"strong interest in effective law enforcement," may tip the balance
against the interests of the accused. 10 9 The Court has further devalued
the benefits of cross-examination by eliminating any requirement for a
showing of unavailability when evaluating co-conspirators' statements. 110
Yet permitting the defendant to call the declarant for impeachment purposes does not provide the same opportunity to discredit a witness as
requiring the prosecution to present the declarant's direct testimony subject to cross-examination. In dissent, Justice Marshall has protested that
"'[o]nly a lawyer without trial experience would suggest that the limited
right to impeach one's own witness is the equivalent of that right to immediate cross-examination which has always been regarded as the great104. Id.
105. Id. at 3156 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Rehnquist, C.J., White & Blackmun, JJ. joined
in the dissent.
106. Id. at 3151-52.
107. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3164-65 (1990).
108. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
109. Id. at 64.
110. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1986).
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est safeguard of American trial procedure.' "111
On the other hand, the Court acknowledges that "'the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial,' "112even though it" 'must occasionally give way to considerations
of public policy and th6 necessities of the case.' ,1113 Thus, it has not
entirely forsaken other values inherent in a trial with live witnesses. The
Court in Maryland v. Craig 1 4 quoted extensively from Mattox v. United
States," 5 a seminal Confrontation Clause case which defined the nature
of the right as follows:
"The primary object of the constitutional provision in question
was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of
the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only
of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury
in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.""' 6
Nevertheless, much of what is being admitted pursuant to the catchalls
appears to be exactly what Mattox would prohibit. For example, admitting grand jury testimony and statements made to law enforcement personnel is contrary to the spirit of Mattox.
Similarly, Craig recognized that confrontation has other benefits.
Confrontation:
(1) [I]nsures that the witness will give his statements under
oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter
and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for
perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth"; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defend111. Id. at 410 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147
F.2d 297, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
112. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3165 (1990) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 63 (1980)).

113. Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
114. Id. at 3163-65.
115. 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
116. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3163 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43

(1895)).
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ant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility."1
The preference for face-to-face accusation has been considered a basic
political commitment to shared responsibility for criminal outcomes,
which emphasizes the moral responsibility of witnesses as accusers and of
juries as decision makers."1 Discarding this preference for live testimony reduces the solemnity of trials, since no oath is taken, and the
declarant is not required to face the accused or to be cross-examined.
The overuse by prosecutors of the catchalls denigrates such process goals
that are implicit in confrontation but are not addressed by decisions that
look primarily at whether hearsay is reliable.
Moreover, if the criminal justice system reflects the shared values of
our society concerning the preservation of individual rights against the
power of the government, we should be wary of evidentiary rules that
effectively lessen the prosecutor's obligation to prove each element of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, even when such rules do not actually
violate constitutional norms. Justice Harlan saw confrontation as providing a check against "flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers,
and absentee witnesses." 1 19 The Court recently reiterated that the "jury
acts as a vital check against wrongful exercise of power by the State and
its prosecutors." 12 0 Yet the shift towards reliability ignores the 1role of
12
confrontation as a shield between the accuser and the accused.
The focus on reliability also ignores broader societal goals. As the
Court noted in a different context, "[t]he purpose of the jury system is to
impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that
a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law by
persons who are fair." 122 In Coy v. Iowa 123 the Court acknowledged that
confrontation "'contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal
justice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness
prevails.' "124 The Court has also recognized:
To foster such a system, the Constitution provides certain safeguards to promote to the greatest possible degree society's in117. Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
118. Swift, Abolishing Hearsay, supra note 84, at 512 n.45.

119. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
120. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371 (1991).
121. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 580 (1988).
122. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372 (exclusions of black jurors can be raised by white defendant
as violating Equal Protection Clause).
123. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
124. Id. at 1019 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986)).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:925

terest inhaving the accused and accuser engage in an open and
even contest in a public trial. The Confrontation Clause advances these goals by ensuring that convictions will not be
based on the charges of unseen and unknown-and hence unchallengeable-individuals. 2
Similarly, the Court appreciates that it is more difficult to tell a lie
about a person to his face than behind his back. 126 "'[T]here is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as "essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution."' ,127 Even a commentator whose review of the empirical
literature led him to believe that transcripts were more reliable than live
testimony, concluded that "[1]ive testimony may be essential to perceptions of fairness, regardless of the real relation between live testimony
128
and accuracy of outcomes."'
Thus, we should care about the type of evidence used to convict a
defendant in terms of the public perception of the fairness of the criminal
justice system. We do not want to foster the perception that there are
two systems of justice: one for affluent defendants who have high visibility or are accused of white collar crimes, in which live witnesses are the
rule and the record on appeal is painstakingly reviewed for error; and
another for the poor and minorities who are charged with violent crimes,
in which courts appear to care less about the type of evidence which is
adequate for conviction and rely heavily on harmless error.
Ultimately, our society must determine how much worse it is to convict an innocent defendant than to acquit a guilty one. The admonition
of In re Winship 2 9 that it is "far worse to convict an innocent man than
to let a guilty man go free,"' 13 0 has been revised to read "[d]ue process
does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to
eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person."13I We are
constantly reminded that "the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant
to a fair trial, not a perfect one."' 1 32 It is time to recognize that the Con125. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
126. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3164 (1990) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,
1019-20 (1988)).
127. Id. (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 404 (1965))).
128. Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1092 (1991).
129. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
130. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
131. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977).
132. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); see also United States v. Hasting,
461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983) (recognizing that "there can be no such thing as an error-free,
perfect trial, and that the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial"); Bruton v. United
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frontation Clause may be an unreliable way to protect the criminal justice system against the onslaught of "trustworthy" hearsay.
Rather than criticizing the Supreme Court for its narrow reading of
confrontation law, we should view this as an opportunity to enact evidentiary rules that exceed constitutionally required standards and incorporate criteria reflecting concerns about fairness in the adversary
process. 133 In a universe of shrinking constitutional protections, evidence law becomes very important to criminal defendants. Without any
evidentiary response, the overuse of the catchalls in criminal cases may
ultimately affect the very character of criminal trials. To preserve trials
in their current form where live witnesses are the rule rather than the
exception, the catchalls should be revised. Only if trial courts must follow stringent criteria will they be less likely to let in ordinary or questionable hearsay pursuant to the catchalls.
D. Should Red Riding Hood Take Advantage of the Hearsay Wolf?
While the focus of this Essay has been on the use of the catchalls
against criminal defendants, it is necessary to briefly discuss use of the
catchalls by the defense to determine how the exceptions should be revised in criminal cases. Given the existing catchall jurisprudence, it is
important for defense counsel to fashion arguments to obtain as favorable
1 34
treatment from courts as is currently being enjoyed by prosecutors.
However, revising the catchalls to encourage use by criminal defendants
raises many of the same concerns about devaluing the preference for live
witnesses. Moreover, the risks of fabrication must always be considered
in evaluating such defense evidence. Even without any modification of
the catchalls, in some cases the defendant's right to due process will require admission of hearsay barred by the evidence rules.135 Similarly, the
United States Supreme Court has agreed that "[w]hether rooted directly
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity
States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (" 'A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect
one.' ") (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)).
133. States that have enacted the catchalls can also interpret their own constitutions as

providing greater protection for such rights as confrontation than does the United States
Constitution.
134. See Raeder, Catch-Ails, supra note 52, at 39-40, for a detailed analysis of how to
structure such arguments.
135. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 301-02 (1973).
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to present a complete defense.' "136 Thus, it is ultimately more important
to limit the prosecutor's use of the catchalls than to expand the defendant's use of them.
IV.

PROPOSALS

The following proposals offer several approaches to revising the
137
catchalls.
A.

Alternative 1

OTHER EXCEPTIONS. A statement whose trustworthiness is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence based on the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement, if the courtspecifically
finds that: (A) exceptional circumstances exist for its admission into evidence; (B) it is not specifically excluded by any of theforegoing exceptions;
and (C) the proponent of the statement provides reasonable notice of its
intention to offer the statement and its particularsin advance of trial, or
duringtrialif the court excuses pretrialnotice on good causeshown. Such
notice shall include the name and address of the declarant, if known, unless the proponent establishesgood causefor not revealingthis information.
This alternative makes no distinction between criminal and civil
cases. It also treats prosecutors and criminal defendants identically.
Such a revision would severely limit the casual use of the catchalls for all
parties and probably reflects the original intention of the rule. It clearly
prohibits the use of the catchall as a way to admit hearsay specifically
prohibited by Rule 803(8). It should also meet any confrontation concerns in criminal cases.

B. Alternative 2
OTHER EXCEPTIONS.

In a civil action or when introduced by a crim-

inal defendant, a statement which has circumstantialguaranteesof trustworthiness if: (A) the proponent of the statement has made a reasonable
effort to produce all more probative admissible evidence to establish the
fact to which the proffered statement relates; and (B) the proponent of the
statement provides reasonable notice of his or her intention to offer the
statement and itsparticularsin advance of trial or during trialif the court
excuses pretrialnotice on good cause shown. Such notice shall include the
136. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citations omitted) (quoting California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
137. These proposals as well as others are currently being studied by the ABA Criminal
Justice Section's Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure which I
chair. The opinions expressed in this Essay are solely my own.
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name and address of the declarant, if known, unless the proponent establishes good cause for not revealing this information.
This proposal eliminates the use of the catchall against criminal
defendants but permits a fairly expansive use in civil trials and when
offered by criminal defendants, subject to Rule 403. It retains the preference for live testimony by requiring a reasonable effort be made to produce the other evidence concerning the issue but permits the hearsay to
be introduced in addition to or in lieu of that testimony if the condition is
satisfied. The rule does not limit trustworthiness determinations to circumstances surrounding the making of the statement.
C. Alternative 3
OTHER EXCEPTIONS.

In a civil action or when introducedby a crim-

inal defendant, a statement which has circumstantialguaranteesof trustworthiness, if the proponent of the statement has made a reasonable effort
to produce all more probative evidence to establish the fact to which the
proffered statement relates. In a criminalaction, when introduced by the
prosecutor,a statement whose trustworthinessis demonstratedby clear and
convincing evidence based on the totality of circumstances that surround
the making of the statement shall be admissible if the court specifically
finds: (A) exceptional circumstancesexist for its admission into evidence;
and (B) it is not specifically excluded by any of the foregoing exceptions.
The proponent of any statement offered pursuant to this rule must provide
reasonable notice of its intention to offer the statement and its particulars
in advance of trial,or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on
good cause shown. Such notice shall include the name and address of the
declarant, if known, unless the proponent establishes good cause for not
revealing this information.
This alternative would result in the catchall being available against
criminal defendants in extremely limited circumstances, while substituting the standard proposed in the second alternative in civil cases and by
criminal defendants. Other rules have made similar distinctions between
criminal defendants and other witnesses, for example Rule 609.138
D.

Other Alternatives

Eliminate Rule 803(24) and revise Rule 804(b)(5) as suggested in the
first, second and third alternatives. This would prohibit any catchall
hearsay in cases where the declarant testifies. These are undoubtedly the
138. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (allowing evidence of criminal defendant's prior conviction to
impeach credibility only if probative value outweighs prejudicial effect to accused).
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most restrictive approaches to the catchalls, and it may be unnecessary to
include such a restriction in the first alternative which already is limited
to exceptional circumstances. Arguably, the first criteria of the second
alternative already accomplishes this result. However, as written, the
second alternative would permit the court to admit the hearsay in addition to the other admissible evidence. In contrast, this alternative would
only permit the hearsay when the declarant of the statement is
unavailable.
Conversely if any of the first three alternatives are adopted they can
be codified as Rule 803(24), and Rule 804(b)(5) could be eliminated.
Rule 804(b)(5) is unnecessary because Rule 803(24) always provides a
method to admit the same evidence.
V.

CONCLUSION

Continued resort to the catchalls by prosecutors raises the specter of
"reliable" hearsay being regularly introduced against the accused in
criminal trials. Such a result was unintended when the catchalls were
drafted, and may exacerbate the tendency to downplay the importance of
live witnesses as a key ingredient of criminal trials. It is time to reaffirm
the value of evidentiary rules by rewriting the catchalls in order to reduce
their routine invocation, instead of continuing to rely on constitutional
barriers to their use.

